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INTRODUCTION 
French psychiatrist and psychoanalyst Bernard Golse recently wrote 
that the term midlife crisis “corresponds to a change, a transition, or 
an existential turning point”1 that “takes place somewhere between 
the ages of thirty-five and fifty.”2  Others, however, contend that the 
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 1. Bernard Golse, Midlife Crisis, in 2 INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS 1055, 1055 (Alain De Mijolla ed., 2005). 
 2. Id. 
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notion of a midlife crisis is merely a myth that “has continually failed 
to receive empirical support.”3 
A myth?  Try telling that to the forty-year-old opinion of Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District.4  The United States 
Supreme Court seminally declared in Tinker that students in public 
schools possess a First Amendment5 right of free expression6 that can 
only be abridged when actual facts7 exist that might reasonably lead 
“school authorities to forecast substantial disruption of or material 
interference with school activities”8 or when the speech “materially 
disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the 
rights of others.”9  Tinker, at middle age,10 is in the midst of a very real, 
very serious jurisprudential crisis and it may be at an “existential 
turning point,”11 waning in importance in the annals of First 
Amendment law. 
How would you feel if someone was calling for your death?  That is 
precisely what Justice Clarence Thomas did two years ago in Morse v. 
Frederick,12 when he wrote that he would “dispense with Tinker 
altogether, and given the opportunity, I would do so.”13  Employing a 
heavy dose of originalism14 in his Morse concurrence15 and 
                                                 
 3. E.g., Jutta Heckhausen, Midlife Crisis, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AGING 933, 933 
(David J. Ekerdt ed., 2002).  Heckhausen adds that “[i]n spite of the evidence 
contradicting it, the notion of a midlife crisis has survived as a public myth about 
development during the fourth and fifth decades of life.”  Id. at 934. 
 4. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
 5. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution provides, in 
pertinent part, that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of 
speech, or of the press.”  U.S. CONST. amend. I.  The Free Speech and Free Press 
Clauses were incorporated more than eight decades ago through the Fourteenth 
Amendment Due Process Clause to apply to state and local government entities and 
officials.  Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925). 
 6. See Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506 (writing that “First Amendment rights, applied in 
light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are available to 
teachers and students.  It can hardly be argued that either students or teachers shed 
their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse 
gate.”). 
 7. Id. at 508.  The Court wrote that an “undifferentiated fear or apprehension 
of disturbance is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”  Id. 
 8. Id. at 514. 
 9. Id. at 513. 
 10. See Ravenna Helson & Christopher J. Soto, Up and Down in Middle Age:  
Monotonic and Nonmonotonic Changes in Roles, Status, and Personality, 89 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 194, 194 (2005) (describing middle age as “roughly between ages 35 
and 65”). 
 11. Golse, supra note 1, at 1055. 
 12. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 13. Id. at 2636 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 14. Originalism can be defined as “the view that the Constitution should be 
construed to fit with the original public meaning of the document.”  Cass R. 
Sunstein, Minimalism Versus Perfectionism in Constitutional Theory:  Second-Order 
Perfectionism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2867, 2867 (2007). 
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emphasizing the notion of in loco parentis,16 Thomas reasoned that 
“Tinker utterly ignored the history of public education”17 and that 
“Tinker has undermined the traditional authority of teachers to 
maintain order in public schools.”18  Thomas thus concluded that 
“[a]s originally understood, the Constitution does not afford students 
a right to free speech in public schools.”19 
“[I]n Morse, Justice Thomas articulated a Dickensian view of the 
world, especially in the public school setting, with virtually no room 
for student rights.”20  If Tinker was, as constitutional law scholar Erwin 
Chemerinsky wrote in 2004, “the high watermark of the Supreme 
Court protecting the constitutional rights of students,”21 then it is not 
too much of a stretch to deem Justice Thomas’s concurrence as the 
low watermark, at least to date, for Tinker’s continued viability. 
Although Tinker survived Justice Thomas’s withering wrath, it now 
faces a new problem: being overshadowed by the high court’s 
opinion in Morse and, in the process, being relegated for use only in 
those cases that mirror or closely parallel its facts.  In particular, and 
as I recently argued elsewhere, lower courts post-Morse are side-
stepping Tinker’s traditional and rigorous substantial-and-material 
disruption standard and substituting, in its place, the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Morse to automatically squelch student speech that 
allegedly threatens violence.22  This seems truly bizarre for two 
                                                                                                                 
 15. See Kenneth W. Starr, Our Libertarian Court:  Bong Hits and the Enduring 
Hamiltonian-Jeffersonian Colloquy, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 5 (2008) (writing that 
“Justice Thomas based his concurrence on his view of the original purpose and 
protection of the Constitution”). 
 16. See Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2631–34 (providing Thomas’s discussion of the in loco 
parentis doctrine) (Thomas, J., concurring).  Thomas ultimately concluded that 
“Tinker’s reasoning conflicted with the traditional understanding of the judiciary’s 
role in relation to public schooling, a role limited by in loco parentis.”  Id. at 2634. 
 17. Id. at 2636. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 2634. 
 20. Stephen Kanter, Bong Hits 4 Jesus as a Cautionary Tale of Two Cities, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 61, 99 (2008).  A Dickensian view of the world captures the paradoxes 
inherent in the modern era of human rights.  To summarize, “[w]e have seen the 
best of human rights protections inscribed on the books, but some of the worst 
human rights violations inflicted on the ground.”  John Witte, Jr., A Dickensian Era of 
Religious Rights:  An Update on Religious Human Rights in Global Perspective, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 707, 707–08 (2001). 
 21. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Deconstitutionalization of Education, 36 LOY. U. CHI. 
L.J. 111, 124 (2004). 
 22. See Clay Calvert, Misuse and Abuse of Morse v. Frederick by Lower Courts:  
Stretching the High Court’s Ruling Too Far To Censor Student Expression, 32 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 1, 4 (2008) (arguing that the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit’s November 2007 decision in Ponce v. Socorro Indep. Sch. Dist., 508 F.3d 765 
(5th Cir. 2007), “allows school administrators to sidestep, avoid, and otherwise dodge 
the application of the Tinker standard when the student speech threatens mass 
violence”). 
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reasons.  First, Morse has nothing, at least factually, to do with violent 
expression but, instead, relates to a banner reading “BONG HiTS 
FOR JESUS”23 that, according to Chief Justice John Roberts’s majority 
opinion, “advocated the use of illegal drugs.”24  Second, the Morse 
holding has no relation to violent expression and is, in fact, very 
narrow;25 the majority concluded only “that schools may take steps to 
safeguard those entrusted to their care from speech that can 
reasonably be regarded as encouraging illegal drug use.”26 
But just six months after the Supreme Court’s ruling in Morse, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, in Ponce v. Socorro 
Independent School District,27 applied Morse to a case involving a student-
written notebook entry that described “a Columbine-style attack on a 
school.”28  In determining whether the speech, which the student 
claimed was “a work of fiction,”29 was protected by the First 
Amendment, the court chose to ignore the rule from Tinker.  It 
reasoned that “Tinker will not always allow school officials to respond 
to threats of violence appropriately”30 and that, instead, “harm of a 
mass school shooting is . . . so devastating and so particular to schools 
that [a] Morse analysis is appropriate.”31  Intimating that Tinker’s 
substantial-and-material disruption test was either too difficult or too 
time consuming for school administrators to apply to such cases, the 
Fifth Circuit wrote that “[s]chool administrators must be permitted to 
react quickly and decisively to address a threat of physical violence 
against their students, without worrying that they will have to face 
years of litigation second-guessing their judgment as to whether the 
threat posed a real risk of substantial disturbance.”32  The Fifth 
Circuit is not alone in suggesting that Morse can be used in place of 
Tinker to squelch violent-themed speech.33 
                                                 
 23. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622–23 (describing the underlying facts of the case). 
 24. Id. at 2625. 
 25. See Melinda Cupps Dickler, The Morse Quartet:  Student Speech and the First 
Amendment, 53 LOY. L. REV. 355, 357 (2007) (“By its plain language, Morse’s holding is 
narrow in that it expressly applies only to student speech promoting illegal drug 
use.”). 
 26. Morse, 127 S. Ct. at 2622. 
 27. 508 F.3d 765 (5th Cir. 2007). 
 28. Id. at 766; see infra note 163 (describing one of the deadliest school shootings 
in United States history). 
 29. Ponce, 508 F.3d at 766. 
 30. Id. at 770. 
 31. Id. at 771 n.2. 
 32. Id. at 772. 
 33. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, in 
upholding a high school’s decision to suspend a student for a violent-themed 
notebook entry, wrote: 
Recently, in Morse, the Supreme Court broadly held that “[t]he special 
characteristics of the school environment and the governmental interest in 
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The problem is this:  As courts expand the scope and power of 
Morse, they contract and reduce the force of Tinker.  The rationale 
reflected here for treating speech that advocates illegal drug use, 
such as the banner in Morse, as the equivalent of student expression 
that features violent content was succinctly summarized in September 
2008 by U.S. District Judge James Knoll Gardner, who wrote: 
Schools at all levels have been affected either directly or indirectly 
by the violent events that have occurred at places like Columbine, 
Virginia Tech, Northern Illinois, Nickel Mines and Red Lion.  The 
impact of violence in schools is so great that it now has equal importance as 
the issue of illegal drug use in schools.34 
Taken together, Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Morse and the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Ponce amount to a “one-two punch” against 
Tinker:  Justice Thomas calls for it to be overruled and then the Fifth 
Circuit, with Tinker still standing, opts to ignore it.  Sadly, Justice 
Thomas is not the only prominent jurist in recent years to denigrate 
the free expression rights of high school students.  Judge Richard 
Posner of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, 
writing in April 2008, opined that “high-school students are not 
adults, schools are not public meeting halls, children are in school to 
be taught by adults rather than to practice attacking each other with 
wounding words, and school authorities have a protective 
relationship and responsibility to all the students.”35  That is a far cry 
from the lofty, speech-inspiring rhetoric36 in Tinker that:  “state-
operated schools may not be enclaves of totalitarianism.  School 
officials do not possess absolute authority over their students;”37 and 
“students may not be regarded as closed-circuit recipients of only that 
which the State chooses to communicate.  They may not be confined 
to the expression of those sentiments that are officially approved.”38 
It is also ironic that Judge Posner would seem to belittle what Tinker 
stands for and, in the words of fellow Seventh Circuit Judge Ilana 
                                                                                                                 
stopping student drug abuse . . . allow schools to restrict student expression 
that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”  That same 
rationale applies equally, if not more strongly, to speech reasonably 
construed as a threat of school violence. 
Boim v. Fulton County Sch. Dist., 494 F.3d 978, 984 (11th Cir. 2007) (citation 
omitted). 
 34. Miller v. Penn Manor Sch. Dist., 588 F. Supp. 2d 606, 616–17 (E.D. Pa. 2008) 
(emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). 
 35. Nuxoll v. Indian Prairie Sch. Dist. #204, 523 F.3d 668, 674–75 (7th Cir. 2008). 
 36. See Aaron H. Caplan, Public School Discipline for Creating Uncensored Anonymous 
Internet Forums, 39 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 93, 120 (2003) (describing how, in Tinker, the 
“majority opinion authored by Justice Abe Fortas has become famous for its stirring 
language” (emphasis added) (footnote omitted)). 
 37. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 511 (1969). 
 38. Id. 
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Diamond Rovner, write an opinion that “repeatedly denigrates”39 
what she calls “the value of the speech and speech rights of high 
school students.”40  The irony arises because Judge Posner, just seven 
years earlier, in American Amusement Machine Ass’n v. Kendrick,41 cited 
Tinker favorably to support his simple, no-nonsense assertion that 
“[c]hildren have First Amendment rights.”42  In Kendrick, Judge 
Posner and the Seventh Circuit enjoined the enforcement of an 
Indianapolis, Indiana law that limited minors’ access in arcades to 
video games that depict violence.43 
All of this is not good news, of course, for the viability of Tinker, 
especially as a bulwark44 against the censorial proclivities of school 
officials and, in turn, the judicial deference granted to their decisions 
in a post-Columbine world.45  Part I of this article highlights and 
analyzes other indicators of the erosion, decline, and abuse of Tinker.  
Part II then explores some possible reasons and explanations for the 
midlife crisis it faces.  Finally, Part III concludes that Tinker is still 
viable today, especially in cases that approximately mirror its facts, 
and that it has been used in some relatively recent cases to safeguard 
student expression.  In other words, Tinker can weather this midlife 
crisis if judges and school administrators take it seriously. 
                                                 
 39. Nuxoll, 523 F.3d at 677 (Rovner, J., concurring). 
 40. Id. 
 41. 244 F.3d 572 (7th Cir. 2001). 
 42. Id. at 576 (citing Tinker and Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 
(1975), to support this proposition). 
 43. Id. at 580. 
 44. See James M. Henderson, Sr., The Public Forum Doctrine in Schools, 69 ST. JOHN’S 
L. REV. 529, 531 (1995) (writing, from his position as Senior Counsel in the 
Washington, D.C., office of the American Center for Law and Justice, that “Tinker has 
remained a bulwark in our legal representation of our student clientele” (emphasis 
added)). 
 45. As the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York 
recently wrote, in the context of upholding the suspension of a fifth-grade student 
for turning in an assignment in which he wrote about blowing up his school, “[t]he 
threat of serious school violence—including mass shootings perpetrated by 
students—is an unfortunate fact of life in twenty-first-century America.”  Cuff v. 
Valley Cent. Sch. Dist., 559 F. Supp. 2d 415, 420 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).  The court then 
observed: 
It is against this backdrop that courts across the country have considered 
First Amendment challenges to discipline imposed on students for speech 
that school officials viewed as threatening.  The overwhelming response has been 
deference on the part of courts to the judgment of educators as to whether a 
perceived threat should be taken seriously and met with discipline in order 
to ensure the safety of the school community. 
Id. (emphasis added). 
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I. INDICATORS OF TINKER’S DECLINE AND ABUSE 
This Part initially examines the trio of Supreme Court decisions 
subsequent to Tinker affecting students’ First Amendment right of 
expression, with each case chipping away at Tinker’s foundation of 
constitutional protection for student speech.  It then analyzes how 
Tinker is today being abused by lower courts to punish students for 
speech that the Supreme Court at the time of Tinker could never have 
imagined—postings on the World Wide Web.  Next, it illustrates how 
Tinker has been stretched by at least one court to shield students from 
emotional injuries caused by offensive expression—a radically 
different use than the facts of Tinker would suggest is appropriate. 
A.  Three Strikes and You’re Out?  Almost. 
The most obvious indicator of Tinker’s decline is that, in each of 
the three subsequent Supreme Court decisions involving student 
expression rights, the Court chose:  (1) not to apply Tinker; (2) to 
carve out fact-specific exceptions to Tinker; and (3) to rule in favor of 
school officials and against students.46 
In 1986, the Supreme Court in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser47 
gave school authorities power to regulate sexually offensive 
expression, reasoning that “it is a highly appropriate function of 
public school education to prohibit the use of vulgar and offensive 
terms in public discourse.”48  It held: 
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.  A high school 
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue 
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.49 
As Stanford Law School Professor Kathleen Sullivan recently 
summed up Fraser, the Court “denied First Amendment protection to 
a student who made sexual remarks in a mandatory school assembly, 
holding that such speech may be restricted as pedagogically 
inappropriate and contrary to the school’s educational mission.”50 
Two years after Fraser, the Supreme Court held in Hazelwood School 
District v. Kuhlmeier51 that “educators do not offend the First 
                                                 
 46. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007); Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. 
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988); Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 
675 (1986). 
 47. 478 U.S. 675 (1986). 
 48. Id. at 683. 
 49. Id. at 685. 
 50. Kathleen M. Sullivan, Free Speech, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 533, 538 (2008). 
 51. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
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Amendment by exercising editorial control over the style and content 
of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as 
their actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical 
concerns.”52  The Court avoided applying Tinker in Kuhlmeier, which 
dealt with the censorship of two articles in a public high school 
newspaper produced as part of a journalism class, reasoning “that the 
standard articulated in Tinker for determining when a school may 
punish student expression need not also be the standard for 
determining when a school may refuse to lend its name and 
resources to the dissemination of student expression.”53  As Professor 
Douglas Laycock succinctly observed, Kuhlmeier stands for the maxim 
that the Tinker “rule does not apply if the speech is school-
sponsored.”54  Two former executive directors of the Student Press 
Law Center put it more bluntly when they wrote that, in Kuhlmeier 
“the Supreme Court has, without sufficient justification, 
disemboweled the [Tinker] disruption standard for school-sponsored 
publications.”55  They called Kuhlmeier “unquestionably a serious step 
backward.”56 
Both Fraser and Kuhlmeier thus can be viewed as chipping away at 
Tinker.  The Supreme Court in Fraser and Kuhlmeier qualified when 
Tinker should apply and “clarified that schools did not in every 
situation need to justify regulation of student speech on the basis that 
the speech would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school.’”57 
After a nineteen-year hiatus post-Kuhlmeier from deciding student 
expression cases, the Supreme Court in 2007 handed down its third-
straight defeat for student speech in Morse v. Frederick.58  Even setting 
aside Justice Thomas’s concurring opinion mentioned earlier,59 the 
Court’s opinion in Morse undermines Tinker.  As Erwin Chemerinsky 
recently observed: 
                                                 
 52. Id. at 273. 
 53. Id. at 272–73. 
 54. Douglas Laycock, High-Value Speech and the Basic Educational Mission of a Public 
School:  Some Preliminary Thoughts, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 111, 112 (2008). 
 55. J. Marc Abrams & S. Mark Goodman, End of an Era?  The Decline of Student 
Press Rights in the Wake of Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 1988 DUKE L.J. 706, 
724 (1988). 
 56. Id. at 732. 
 57. Barr v. Lafon, 538 F.3d 554, 563 (6th Cir. 2008) (quoting Tinker v. Des 
Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969)). 
 58. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 59. See supra notes 12–19 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Thomas’s 
argument to overturn Tinker, as set forth in his concurring opinion in Morse). 
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In Bethel, the Court at least argued that Fraser’s speech disrupted 
school activities, but in Morse v. Frederick, the Court made no effort 
to do so.  Although the Court did not overrule Tinker, it clearly 
abandoned the idea that speech can be punished only if it is 
actually disruptive of school activities.60 
In summary, the trio of Supreme Court student-speech cases 
subsequent to Tinker have all whittled away at Tinker’s free-expression 
triumph,61 “greatly alter[ing] the holding set forth by the Warren 
Court.”62  Tinker, in essence, has become the back-up rule for student 
speech cases:  It is applied only if the facts before a court fall outside 
the framework of sexually lewd and offensive expression (Bethel), 
school-sponsored expression (Kuhlmeier), or expression that 
advocates illegal drug use (Morse).63  After chalking up a victory for 
student speech rights in Tinker, the Supreme Court has now ruled 
against students in three consecutive cases from 1986 through 2007. 
B. Abusing Tinker in Cyberspace  
When the Supreme Court is not carving out exceptions to Tinker, 
some lower courts are now using—misusing, really—Tinker in a 
situation and scenario that the Court in 1969 could hardly have 
imagined.  In particular, they are incorrectly applying it to censor off-
campus student expression that is posted on the World Wide Web.64 
For instance, in July 2007, the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit in Wisniewski v. Board of Education of Weedsport 
                                                 
 60. Erwin Chemerinsky, How Will Morse v. Frederick be Applied?, 12 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 17, 20 (2008). 
 61. Cf. Brannon P. Denning & Molly C. Taylor, Morse v. Frederick and the 
Regulation of Student Cyberspeech, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 835, 840 (2008) (writing 
that “[c]ommentators generally hailed Tinker, and deplored what they saw as a 
narrowing of it by Fraser and Kuhlmeier” (footnote omitted)). 
 62. Mark G. Yudof, Tinker Tailored:  Good Faith, Civility, and Student Expression, 69 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 365, 366 (1995). 
 63. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently wrote, 
vulgar and obscene speech is governed by Fraser, school-sponsored speech is 
governed by Kuhlmeier, and “all other speech is governed by Tinker.”  Lowery v. 
Euverard, 497 F.3d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 2007).  Similarly, the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a ruling handed down prior to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Morse v. Frederick, wrote that “for all other speech, meaning 
speech that is neither vulgar, lewd, indecent or plainly offensive under Fraser, nor 
school-sponsored under [Kuhlmeier], the rule of Tinker applies.”  Guiles v. Marineau, 
461 F.3d 320, 325 (2d Cir. 2006). 
 64. See Rita J. Verga, Policing Their Space:  The First Amendment Parameters of School 
Discipline of Student Cyberspeech, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 727, 
730–33 (2007) (noting that “most lower courts have applied the Supreme Court’s 
Tinker standard to off-campus speech,” and that, although the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on whether public schools possess the power to punish students’ off-
campus speech posted in cyberspace, “lower courts have reached the consensus that 
Tinker’s substantial disruption standard governs such speech”). 
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Central School District65 applied Tinker’s substantial-and-material 
disruption standard to affirm the suspension of a student “for sharing 
with friends via the Internet a small drawing crudely, but clearly, 
suggesting that a named teacher should be shot and killed.”66  Even 
though the instant-messaging icon in question was created by student 
Aaron Wisniewski “on his parents’ home computer,”67 the Second 
Circuit reasoned that “off-campus conduct can create a foreseeable 
risk of substantial disruption within a school”68 and that Tinker is “the 
appropriate First Amendment standard”69 to apply when evaluating 
“school officials’ authority to discipline a student’s expression 
reasonably understood as urging violent conduct.”70  The Second 
Circuit concluded that “there can be no doubt that the icon, once 
made known to the teacher and other school officials, would 
foreseeably create a risk of substantial disruption within the school 
environment.”71 
In May 2008, the Second Circuit once again applied Tinker to 
uphold the punishment of a high school student, this time for an off-
campus blog posting, in Doninger v. Niehoff.72  The court concluded 
that the student Avery Doninger’s posting, which referred to school 
administrators as the “douchebags in central office”73 and urged 
classmates to write or call one administrator “to piss her off more,”74 
“created a foreseeable risk of substantial disruption to the work and 
discipline of the school and that Doninger has thus failed to show 
clearly that Avery’s First Amendment rights were violated when she 
was disqualified from running for Senior Class Secretary.”75 
Several years before the Second Circuit’s rulings in Wisniewski and 
Doninger, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in J.S. ex rel. H.S. v. 
Bethlehem Area School District76 applied Tinker to affirm a school’s 
punishment of a student, J.S., who created, while off campus and at 
home, a website that “contained derogatory, profane, offensive and 
threatening statements directed toward one of the student’s teachers 
and his principal.”77  In doing so, the Court observed that the “few 
                                                 
 65. 494 F.3d 34 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 66. Id. at 35. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at 39. 
 69. Id. at 38. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 40. 
 72. 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008). 
 73. Id. at 45. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. at 53. 
 76. 807 A.2d 847 (Pa. 2002). 
 77. Id. at 850. 
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courts that have considered Internet communication have focused 
upon Tinker in their analysis.”78  Applying Tinker, the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court held that: 
[W]e are satisfied that the School District has demonstrated that 
J.S.’s web site created an actual and substantial interference with 
the work of the school to a magnitude that satisfies the 
requirements of Tinker.  Thus . . . we find that the School District’s 
disciplinary action taken against J.S. did not violate his First 
Amendment right to freedom of speech.79 
Tinker is being abused in cases such as Wisniewski, Doninger, and J.S. 
because it was never designed to be applied to off-campus speech 
scenarios.  First, Tinker dealt with speech that took place on campus—
the wearing of black armbands while on school property to protest 
the war in Vietnam.80  Tinker was “the first case explicitly to recognize 
a student’s right to freedom of expression on campus.”81 
Second, the Supreme Court in Tinker only considered, in its 
explicit reasoning, on-campus scenarios and on-campus locations 
during school hours when adopting its substantial-and-material 
disruption test.82  As Justice Abe Fortas wrote: 
A student’s rights, therefore, do not embrace merely the classroom 
hours.  When he is in the cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the 
campus during the authorized hours, he may express his opinions, even 
on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so 
without “materially and substantially interfer[ing] with the 
requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the 
school” and without colliding with the rights of others.83 
Justice Fortas was careful to note that school officials did possess 
authority over students, but he described this in the context of on-
campus control, writing that “the Court has repeatedly emphasized 
the need for affirming the comprehensive authority of the States and 
of school officials, consistent with fundamental constitutional 
safeguards, to prescribe and control conduct in the schools.”84  And 
                                                 
 78. Id. at 866. 
 79. Id. at 869. 
 80. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 504 (1969) 
(noting the students in the case “determined to publicize their objections to the 
hostilities in Vietnam and their support for a truce by wearing black armbands 
during the holiday season”). 
 81. Paul J. Beard II & Robert Luther III, A Superintendent’s Guide to Student Free 
Speech in California Public Schools, 12 U.C. DAVIS J. JUV. L. & POL’Y 381, 387 (2008) 
(emphasis added). 
 82. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 512–13. 
 83. Id. (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966)) (emphasis 
added). 
 84. Id. at 507 (emphasis added). 
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seemingly, by definition, the creation and posting of a website by a 
student at home, on his or her own computer, is not in-school 
conduct.  Moreover, Justice Fortas also made it clear that the Tinker 
Court was measuring and defining the scope of First Amendment 
speech rights for students “in light of the special characteristics of the 
school environment.”85  The Court was not evaluating those rights 
outside of that environment, such as on a student’s home computer. 
An early analysis of Internet-posted student expression cases 
contended that the “clear inference”86 to be drawn from Tinker, Fraser, 
and Kuhlmeier—none of which involved off-campus-created speech—
is that the Supreme Court “is assuming the school’s authority over the 
speech of its students ends as the student leaves the schoolhouse.”87 
Several more points must be made as to why Tinker should not be 
applied to censor off-campus student expression.  First, individuals 
(teachers, principals, or students) who are defamed by the off-
campus, Internet postings of students already have sufficient remedies 
at their disposal in the form of civil libel suits that can be filed against 
those who post defamatory information.88  It is tantamount to judicial 
overkill for courts to allow not only defamation suits but also in-
school punishment for such off-campus expression.  Courts should 
not allow schools to exert a second form of punishment (suspension 
or expulsion, for instance) when a libel suit will suffice to make whole 
the individuals who are harmed. 
Second, extending Tinker to off-campus speech intrudes on the 
realm of parental rights.  Schools must not be allowed to usurp 
control from parents over the off-campus speech and off-campus 
behavior of their children simply because such speech or behavior 
relates to or is somehow about other students or administrators.  
                                                 
 85. Id. at 506 (emphasis added). 
 86. Leora Harpaz, Internet Speech and the First Amendment Rights of Public School 
Students, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 123, 142 (2000). 
 87. Id. 
 88. For instance, a public school principal from Pennsylvania named Eric W. 
Trosch filed a defamation lawsuit against four former students who he claimed 
posted defamatory statements about him on the Internet via fake MySpace profiles.  
See Joe Pinchot, Principal Sues 4 Ex-students Over Profiles on Myspace, HERALD, Apr. 4. 
2007, http://www.sharon-herald.com/local/local_story_094195802.html.  In 
addition to such out-of-school efforts at redress, Trosch also punished one of those 
same students, Justin Layshock, at school for Layshock’s fake profile of Trosch, 
leading to a federal lawsuit in Layshock v. Hermitage School District, 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 
(W.D. Pa. 2007).  Similarly, Principal Cyd Duffin of Colony High School in Alaska 
filed a lawsuit for defamation and invasion of privacy in 2009 based upon a fake 
MySpace profile of her.  Zaz  Hollander, Abusive MySpace Page Draws Principal’s 
Lawsuit, ANCHORAGE DAILY NEWS, Apr. 7, 2009, http://www.adn.com/ 
news/alaska/matsu/story/748805.html.  Although Duffin sued not only MySpace, 
but also the unknown creator of the website, who may or may not be a student.  Id.   
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When students are off campus and not engaged in school events like 
field trips, they are no longer students but are, instead, minors under 
parental control and supervision.89 
This point was made clear in an appellate brief, co-written by 
attorneys from the American Civil Liberties Union of Pennsylvania, 
and filed in 2008 on behalf of Justin Layshock in his appeal of the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania’s 
decision in Layshock v. Hermitage School District,90 another case 
involving in-school punishment for Internet-posted expression: 
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely decided where 
school authority stops—and parental authority begins—inherent in 
the Supreme Court’s . . . student-speech cases is the elemental 
proposition that, when exiting the schoolhouse gates, students 
regain whatever rights they shed upon entry.  The rationales that 
justify curtailing students’ rights in school disappear when students 
return to the community and to the control of their parents.91 
Third, Tinker dealt with both a mode of expression (clothing) and 
a target of expression (a government policy on the war in Vietnam) 
that are radically unlike the scenarios now playing out in cyberspace 
with student speech.  In particular, the speech involved in cases such 
as Wisniewski, Doninger, and J.S. does not target government policies 
of war-time importance, but rather is directed at specific individuals 
(teachers, principals, or classmates) and meant to cause them injury.  
These simply are very different factual scenarios from Tinker. 
C. Abusing Tinker To Provide Students with Emotional Tranquility 
Perhaps one of the more memorable lines from the Supreme 
Court’s opinion in Tinker was its statement that school officials, in 
order to justify speech regulation, must show “something more than a 
mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always 
accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”92 
Despite this admonition, and other language in Tinker buttressing 
the notion that student speech cannot be squelched because it 
                                                 
 89. Cf. Frederick v. Morse, 127 S. Ct. 2618,  2631 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(noting that rationale for schools’ ability to discipline students is based in the 
principle of in loco parentis, or in other words, based on the power of schools to act 
as a parent to children while the student is in school). 
 90. 496 F. Supp. 2d 587 (W.D. Pa. 2007). 
 91. Second-Step Brief of Appellee and Cross-Appellants at 15, Layshock v. 
Hermitage Sch. Dist., Nos. 07-4465 & 07-4555 (3d Cir. May 22, 2008), available at 
http://www.citmedialaw.org/sites/citmedialaw.org/files/2008-05-22-Layshocks%20 
Appellate%20Brief.pdf. 
 92. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 509 (1969) 
(emphasis added). 
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offends,93 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
held in 2006 that Tinker allowed school officials at Poway High School 
to prohibit the wearing of a t-shirt with the anti-gay message, 
“HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL.”94  The issue in Harper v. Poway 
Unified School District, as framed narrowly by the two-judge majority,95 
was “whether schools may prohibit the wearing of T-shirts on high 
school campuses and in high school classes that flaunt 
demeaning slogans, phrases or aphorisms relating to a core 
characteristic of particularly vulnerable students and that may cause 
them significant injury.”96  The Ninth Circuit concluded that such 
regulation is permissible.97 
The majority deemed that exposure to the anti-gay messages on the 
t-shirts worn by student Tyler Chase Harper98 would constitute “a 
destructive and humiliating experience”99 for gay students because 
the messages “injure students with respect to their core 
characteristics.”100  The majority then found that because “the record 
demonstrates that Harper’s speech intruded upon the rights of other 
students, the School’s restriction is permissible under Tinker.”101 
What makes the Ninth Circuit’s opinion quite a stretch from Tinker 
is that the majority focused on what it called “the application of the 
‘rights of others’ prong of Tinker”102 rather than on Tinker’s other 
                                                 
 93. The Supreme Court in Tinker also wrote that “[a]ny word spoken, in class, in 
the lunchroom, or on the campus, that deviates from the views of another person 
may start an argument or cause a disturbance.  But our Constitution says we must 
take this risk.”  Id. at 508. 
 94. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 445 F.3d 1166, 1171, 1182 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(holding “that the School’s restriction of Harper’s right to carry messages on his T-
shirt was permissible under Tinker”), vacated, 549 U.S. 1262, 1262 (2007). 
 95. The majority opinion in Harper was authored by Judge Stephen Reinhardt 
and joined by Judge Sidney R. Thomas, while Judge Alex Kozinski, the current chief 
judge of the Ninth Circuit, dissented.  445 F.3d at 1170, 1192. 
 96. Id. at 1182. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Judge Reinhardt wrote: 
On April 21, 2004, the date of the 2004 “Day of Silence,” appellant Tyler 
Chase Harper wore a T-shirt to school on which “I WILL NOT ACCEPT 
WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED,” was handwritten on the front and 
“HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27’” was handwritten on the 
back.  There is no evidence in the record that any school staff saw Harper’s 
T-shirt on that day. 
  The next day, April 22, 2004, Harper wore the same T-shirt to school, 
except that the front of the shirt read “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL 
EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED,” while the back retained the 
same message as before, “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 
1:27.’” 
Id. at 1171. 
 99. Id. at 1182. 
 100. Id. at 1186. 
 101. Id. at 1185. 
 102. Id. at 1184. 
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language regarding whether the speech would cause a “substantial 
disruption of or material interference with school activities.”103  The 
rights-of-others language to which the majority in Harper referred 
occurs in several places in Tinker, the most prominent of which is 
where the Supreme Court explained that student speech that 
constitutes an “invasion of the rights of others is, of course, not 
immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech.”104 
Ultimately, the majority in Harper found that the rights of gay 
students were impermissibly violated because “[p]ublic school 
students who may be injured by verbal assaults on the basis of a core 
identifying characteristic such as race, religion, or sexual orientation, 
have a right to be free from such attacks while on school campuses.”105  
Although the Supreme Court later vacated the Ninth Circuit decision 
with instructions to dismiss the appeal as moot,106 the case was still 
alive in February 2008, when a motion for reconsideration on behalf 
of Kelsie K. Harper, Tyler Chase Harper’s younger sister and a then-
current student at Poway High School, was heard and denied by 
Judge John A. Houston of the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of California.107  Judge Houston noted that “[t]he 
Supreme Court cases cannot be read to have abandoned Tinker’s 
‘rights of others to be left alone’ prong under the guise of religion 
and free speech protections afforded by the First Amendment.”108  
The decision was, once again, appealed to the Ninth Circuit.109 
                                                 
 103. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 514 (1969). 
 104. Id. at 513.  The Court reasoned: 
The school officials banned and sought to punish petitioners for a silent, 
passive expression of opinion, unaccompanied by any disorder or 
disturbance on the part of petitioners.  There is here no evidence whatever 
of petitioners’ interference, actual or nascent, with the schools’ work or of 
collision with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone.  
Accordingly, this case does not concern speech or action that intrudes upon 
the work of the schools or the rights of other students. 
Id. at 508 (emphasis added). 
 105. Harper, 445 F.3d at 1178. 
 106. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 549 U.S. 1262, 1262 (2007).  In April 
2007, the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal, pursuant to the Supreme Court’s 
instructions.  Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 485 F.3d 1052, 1053 (9th Cir. 2007). 
 107. Harper v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 545 F. Supp. 2d 1072, 1095 (S.D. Cal. 
2008). 
 108. Id. at 1101.  Judge Houston ultimately concluded that “the district properly 
restricted Harper’s negative speech for the legitimate pedagogical concern of promoting 
tolerance and respect for differences among students.”  Id. (emphasis added).  This 
is a very peculiar rationale because it borrows its key terms from the Supreme Court’s 
ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988), in which the 
Court considered the censorship of a school newspaper that was part of the high 
school curriculum and held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273.  The problem is that Kuhlmeier involved 
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The Ninth Circuit’s 2006 ruling is, indeed, an odd application of 
Tinker.  As put by one commentator, “[t]he vast majority of cases 
applying Tinker have focused on the ‘substantial disruption’ standard, 
whereas the Harper v. Poway panel opinion seized on the oft-ignored 
Tinker language of ‘invasion of the rights of others.’  Lower courts 
need guidance on the application of this part of Tinker.”110 
Other commentary bluntly points out the peculiarity and 
idiosyncratic nature of the Harper ruling and its interpretation of 
Tinker—specifically noting that “the Ninth Circuit’s opinion made 
history; it was the first reported opinion to restrict student speech by 
relying on Tinker’s rights-of-others exception.”111  Indeed, at least one 
federal appellate court, in recently defining the Tinker test, failed to 
even mention the rights-of-others exception.112  More importantly, in 
Morse v. Frederick,113 Chief Justice John Roberts omitted mention of the 
rights-of-others exception when he wrote that “Tinker held that 
student expression may not be suppressed unless school officials 
reasonably conclude that it will ‘materially and substantially disrupt 
the work and discipline of the school.’”114 
The Ninth Circuit’s broad reading of Tinker that permitted a school 
to stop the wearing of t-shirts with anti-gay messages in the name of 
                                                                                                                 
consideration of “educators’ authority over school-sponsored publications, theatrical 
productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, and members of 
the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.”  Id. at 
271.  The t-shirts at issue in Harper, however, were in no way sponsored by the school 
or part of its curriculum, so borrowing a justification from Kuhlmeier to suppress the 
speech at issue in Harper stretches Kuhlmeier beyond its narrow scope.  If Tinker is 
suffering from a midlife crisis, as this article contends, then perhaps Kuhlmeier may be 
suffering from what singer John Mayer called a “quarter-life crisis.”  See John Moore, 
Positive Messages Are at Hand in “Q,” DENVER POST, Sept. 12, 2008, at D-15 (describing 
“the self-absorption of John Mayer’s ‘quarter-life crisis’ generation”); Thomas Walter, 
No Frills Works for Mayer, WASH. TIMES, Aug. 18, 2003, at B5 (noting the “quarter-life 
crisis” that John Mayer sings about in his song “Why Georgia”). 
 109. Press Release, Alliance Def. Fund, Poway Free Speech Case Again Before 9th 
Circuit (Mar. 31, 2008), available at http://www.alliancedefensefund.org/news/ 
pressrelease.aspx?cid=4443. 
 110. David L. Hudson, Jr., Tinkering with Tinker Standards?, 
FIRSTAMENDMENTCENTER.ORG, Aug. 9. 2006, http://www.firstamendmentcenter.org/ 
analysis.aspx?id=17253. 
 111. Holning Lau, Pluralism:  A Principle for Children’s Rights, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. 
REV. 317, 366–67 (2007). 
 112. For instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in 
2006 observed, in the context of a student t-shirt case, that “Tinker established a 
protective standard for student speech under which it cannot be suppressed based 
on its content, but only because it is substantially disruptive.”  Guiles v. Marineau, 461 
F.3d 320, 326 (2d Cir. 2006).  The Second Circuit added that, under Tinker, 
“[s]chools may not regulate such student speech unless it would materially and 
substantially disrupt classwork and discipline in the school.”  Id. at 325. 
 113. 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
 114. Id. at 2626 (quoting Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 
503, 513 (1969)). 
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preventing emotional injury also conflicts with other rulings on the 
subject.  For instance, in the 2005 case Nixon v. Northern Local School 
District Board of Education,115 Judge George C. Smith of the United 
States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio issued a 
permanent injunction against a school district that tried to stop 
student James Nixon from wearing a t-shirt bearing an anti-gay 
statement.116  Judge Smith did not consider the rights-of-others 
language from Tinker, but instead focused on the well-accepted 
disruption prong and enjoined Nixon’s school from regulating his 
expression absent a demonstration “that the shirt is substantially 
disrupting or interfering with the school’s activities or that an 
imminent and substantial disruption is likely to occur”117 and found 
that, absent such actual or imminent substantial disruption or 
interference, Nixon “shall be entitled to wear his T-shirt to school 
without any repercussions” from school officials.118  The key is that 
this language is devoid of any mention of the rights-of-others 
language from Tinker. 
Supreme Court Justice Samuel Alito wrote, while serving on the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit and declaring 
unconstitutional a school district policy that prohibited anti-gay 
messages, that “[t]he Supreme Court has held time and again, both 
within and outside of the school context, that the mere fact that 
someone might take offense at the content of speech is not sufficient 
justification for prohibiting it.”119  In doing so, he openly questioned 
the rights-of-others prong of Tinker, noting that its language and 
subsequent interpretation was ambiguous.120  He opined that in order 
to satisfy this Tinker prong, “it is certainly not enough that the speech 
is merely offensive to some listener.”121 
In summary, the Ninth Circuit abused and misused Tinker in such a 
way in Harper as to allow for viewpoint-based discrimination122 against 
                                                 
 115. 383 F. Supp. 2d 965 (S.D. Ohio 2005). 
 116. Id. at 966.  The t-shirt, which was black with white lettering, included the 
statement “Homosexuality is a sin!” on the back side.  Id. at 967. 
 117. Id. at 975. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Saxe v. State Coll. Area Sch. Dist., 240 F.3d 200, 215 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(observing that at least one court has limited Tinker to tortious speech such as libel 
and slander). 
 120. Id. at 217 (citing Slotterback v. Interboro Sch. Dist., 766 F. Supp. 280, 289 n.8 
(E.D. Pa. 1991)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. The general rule against viewpoint-based discrimination is indicative of “a 
fundamental First Amendment principle—that government may not proscribe 
speech or expressive conduct because it disapproves of the ideas expressed.”  
Esperanza Peace & Just. Ctr. v. City of San Antonio, 316 F. Supp. 2d 433, 444 (W.D. 
Tex. 2001).  Conversely, “it is a central tenet of the First Amendment that the 
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speech (pro-gay t-shirts would be permissible under the reasoning in 
Harper but not anti-gay messages), all in the name of preventing the 
alleged emotional harm that supposedly would befall gay students 
who read the t-shirts.  This is particularly ironic since anti-gay speech 
is what might be called core political speech,123 especially in California 
where Harper took place, given recent controversies there involving 
ballot propositions124 and judicial rulings125 regarding same-sex 
marriage.  The speech in Tinker, of course, also was core political 
speech conveyed on an article of clothing.126  If the Supreme Court’s 
1988 ruling in Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier,127 which gives 
school officials wide latitude to squelch student expression in school-
sponsored publications and when the speech is part of the 
curriculum,128 does not allow for viewpoint-based discrimination, as 
some lower courts have ruled,129 then it is ironic that a more pro-
                                                                                                                 
government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”  FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978). 
 123. See generally Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003) (noting that, under 
some circumstances, cross burning may mean that a “person is engaged in core 
political speech”); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346–48 (1995) 
(using the phrase “core political speech” and discussing it in terms of public issues 
that affect elections). 
 124. For instance, Californians in 2008 voted on Proposition 8, which would 
amend the state constitution to define marriage as between a man and a woman.  
Jessica Garrison, Prop. 8 Leads in New Poll, Opponents Say, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2008, at 
B3.  The measure was so controversial that campaigns for and against it raised almost 
$60 million, making it the most costly measure in the country of the year.  Dan 
Morain & Jessica Garrison, Prop. 8 Foes, Fans Amass $60 Million, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 25, 
2008, at B1.  The measure, ultimately, was passed by California voters on November 
4, 2008, but lawsuits were filed shortly thereafter asking that it be overturned.  Maura 
Dolan & Tami Abdollah, Gay Rights Supporters File 3 Lawsuits Against Prop. 8, L.A. 
TIMES, Nov. 6, 2008, at A23. 
 125. In 2008, the California Supreme Court considered whether failing to 
officially recognize same-sex marriages violated the state constitution.  In re Marriage 
Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008).  A majority of the California Supreme Court 
reasoned that “the state interest in limiting the designation of marriage exclusively to 
opposite-sex couples, and in excluding same-sex couples from access to that 
designation, cannot properly be considered a compelling state interest for equal 
protection purposes.”  Id. at 451.  It concluded that it was unconstitutional for 
California statutory law to limit marriage to a union “between a man and a woman.”  
Id. at 453. 
 126. See Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2626 (2007) (writing that the speech 
in Tinker substantially implicated the First Amendment, as the students were 
engaging in political “concerns at the heart of the First Amendment.  The students 
sought to engage in political speech . . . .”). 
 127. 484 U.S. 260 (1988). 
 128. The Court held that “educators do not offend the First Amendment by 
exercising editorial control over the style and content of student speech in school-
sponsored expressive activities so long as their actions are reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.”  Id. at 273. 
 129. See Banon v. Sch. Dist. Palm Beach County, 387 F.3d 1208, 1215 (11th Cir. 
2004) (determining that “Hazelwood does not allow a school to censor school-
sponsored speech based on viewpoint”); Hansen v. Ann Arbor Pub. Schs., 293 F. 
Supp. 2d 780, 797 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (observing that “even under Hazelwood, a . . . 
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student speech decision like Tinker would embrace such 
discrimination. 
With these indicators of Tinker’s midlife crisis in mind, the next 
Part of this Article turns to a brief examination of some of the likely 
reasons for the opinion’s decline. 
II. POSSIBLE REASONS FOR TINKER’S MIDLIFE CRISIS 
There probably is no single variable or causal force that has 
precipitated the midlife crisis of Tinker; it would be far too 
reductionist to believe that was the situation.  It thus is initially 
helpful to examine the situational context in which the Tinker 
opinion was spawned, and then to analyze how times have changed 
and events have transpired subsequent to it, leading up to today’s 
“millennial” generation and the election of Barack Obama to the 
presidency. 
Tinker was decided in 1969 and to a large extent, can be viewed as a 
product of the antiwar, free-speech movement of the 1960s.130  As 
Professor Stanley Ingber wrote as part of a symposium examining 
students’ rights twenty-five years after Tinker: 
It was a time remembered more for political and cultural conflict, 
urban chaos, civil rights battles, free speech movements on 
university campuses, and, perhaps most of all, the national divide 
over the Vietnam War.  The 1960s was an era during which the 
value of order—of deference to authority—was challenged 
profoundly, to the great chagrin of those who view order as an 
imperative in a civilized society.  This era of turmoil is the context 
in which one must understand the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District.131 
Viewed in this light, a pro-student speech ruling made sense.  As 
Professor Ingber put it, “in an age when claims of liberty were 
embraced increasingly while those heralding authority were deemed 
suspect, one would have been most surprised had the Court ruled 
that students were totally devoid of First Amendment protections.”132  
                                                                                                                 
school’s restrictions on speech reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns 
must still be viewpoint-neutral”) (emphasis added).  But see Fleming v. Jefferson County 
Sch. Dist. R-1, 298 F.3d 918, 926–27 (10th Cir. 2002) (concluding that there is no 
requirement of viewpoint neutrality, while acknowledging that courts are split over 
the issue). 
 130. E.g., Jon C. Dubin, Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 
1461, 1465 (1998) (recognizing that during the 1960s the United States was “an era 
of civil rights activism, antiwar protests, the welfare rights movement and an 
emerging view of law as an instrument of progressive social change”). 
 131. Stanley Ingber, Liberty and Authority:  Two Facets of the Inculcation of Virtue, 69 
ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 421, 421 (1995). 
 132. Id. at 421–22. 
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Of course, for Justice Hugo Black, who dissented in Tinker, the 
turmoil was precisely the reason to deny students’ protection, as he 
observed that “groups of students all over the land are already 
running loose, conducting break-ins, sit-ins, lie-ins, and smash-ins.”133  
He predicted a parade of horrors arising from Tinker: 
Here a very small number of students have crisply and summarily 
refused to obey a school order designed to give pupils who want to 
learn the opportunity to do so.  One does not need to be a prophet 
or the son of a prophet to know that after the Court’s holding 
today some students in Iowa schools and indeed in all schools will 
be ready, able, and willing to defy their teachers on practically all 
orders.134 
It is not surprising, of course, that Justice Thomas seized upon this 
exact language from Justice Black’s bitter dissent when he called in 
Morse v. Frederick for the demise of Tinker, agreeing that Tinker had 
indeed significantly undermined the authority of teachers at public 
schools.135  Justice Black’s dissent thus laid the groundwork for at least 
part of Tinker’s midlife crisis. 
Evolving times also have precipitated trouble for Tinker.  Since 
Tinker, courts have increasingly perceived public schools as 
responsible for instilling community values in their students, perhaps 
at the cost of suppressing individual rights.136  The problems for 
student speech have been even further compounded by two major 
factors:  1) a climate of fear of mass-scale violence in public schools 
that has led some administrators to squelch any expression that 
portends violence and that, in turn, militates in favor of judicial 
deference to school-imposed censorship;137 and 2) widespread use of 
                                                 
 133. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 525 (1969) 
(Black, J., dissenting). 
 134. Id. at 524–25.  Black included examples of such dire-circumstances 
hyperbole, such as children under eighteen being allowed to vote and hold positions 
on the board of education.  Id. at 518. 
 135. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2636 (2007) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(citation omitted). 
 136. See Yudof, supra note 62, at 366 (“Today, children in public schools are 
viewed less as the bearers of individual rights and more as the repositories of 
community responsibilities.”). 
 137. As the author of this article and a colleague wrote back in 2003: 
Quite simply, the events at Columbine gave high school administrators all 
the reasons—legitimate or illegitimate—they needed to trounce the First 
Amendment rights of public school students in the name of preventing 
violence.  The first wave of censorship cases that swelled up in the year 
immediately following Columbine is now well documented.  But the fear of 
Columbine-like violence that gave rise to that wave has not subsided in the 
years since. 
Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Columbine Fallout:  The Long-Term Effects on Free 
Expression Take Hold in Public Schools, 83 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1091 (2003). 
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the Internet by students to post material that openly mocks and 
pokes fun at classmates, teachers, and administrators in a public 
forum available to people all around the world—a vastly open forum 
that school administrators now wish to close and control.138 
These two variables have become important forces in leading to 
censorship, in my opinion.  In particular, no principal wants to err on 
the side of free speech and fail to punish a student who writes violent 
stories and, as it later turns out, goes on to commit violent acts at 
school.  Sacrificing a little free speech for potentially saving lives is a 
“no brainer” from a principal’s perspective.  The principal, in turn, is 
cut substantial judicial slack when he or she forecasts, under Tinker, a 
substantial disruption when evaluating a student writing to determine 
its potential to cause harm.139  However, such an encroachment on 
individual rights is not without its critics.  As Colorado attorney 
Edward T. Ramey wrote in 2000: 
The great threat of convulsions like Columbine is that they make it 
seductively easy to be innocently dishonest.  We become at least 
temporarily more tolerant of those who, frequently with the best of 
intentions, would impose (rather than truthfully seek to teach and 
inculcate) a viewpoint or lifestyle and stifle a competing one.140 
In terms of the Internet, I suspect there is some trepidation that 
school officials encounter in providing students with speech rights on 
new technologies (the Internet) and through new means (texting 
and instant-messaging, for instance) with which those officials lack 
familiarity and understanding.  The power of new communications 
technologies is partly what is so scary for some school administrators 
and teachers, I believe. 
A generational shift of teachers (as old teachers retire and new 
teachers are hired) in the near future, of course, may bode well for 
freedom of speech, with younger teachers and administrators, who 
grew up with and were weaned on the Internet, assuming 
pedagogical positions of power in public schools.  They may be less 
likely to be afraid of those technologies and more likely to 
understand, for better or worse, that some abuse of those 
technologies by students is inevitable.141 
                                                 
 138. See supra notes 64–87 and accompanying text (describing cases in which 
courts have applied Tinker in order to punish off-campus-created speech that is 
posted on the Internet). 
 139. See supra note 45 and accompanying text (discussing the deference granted 
by courts to school officials). 
 140. Edward T. Ramey, Student Expression:  The Legacy of Tinker in the Wake of 
Columbine, 77 DENV. U. L. REV. 699, 710 (2000). 
 141. The United States Supreme Court made a similar statement when 
considering abuse of press freedom in the seminal prior restraint case of Near v. 
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The Tinker test itself has multiple flaws that harm its effectiveness 
and, concomitantly, has lead to its misuse and abuse.142  As aptly 
recognized by Professor Mark Yudof, current president of the 
University of California: 
When I was a law professor, I used to ask my students the following 
questions:  What counts as a disruption?  How much disruption will 
outweigh the assertion of the right?  How are these interests 
balanced?  Is this rule, with its emphasis on identifying disruption 
in schools, a rule at all, or is it just an invitation to judges to assert 
their personal ideologies and persuasions?143 
Some of these same problems were, in fact, mentioned by Judge 
Richard Posner in his convoluted 2008 opinion in Nuxoll v. Indian 
Prairie School District,144 which allowed a student to wear a t-shirt 
conveying the message “Be Happy, Not Gay.”145  Judge Posner openly 
queried “what is ‘substantial disruption’?  Must it amount to ‘disorder 
or disturbance’?  Must class work be disrupted and if so how 
severely?”146  Indeed one federal appellate court recently stretched 
the meaning of substantial disruption to apply not only to 
interference with educational processes, teaching and learning inside 
the classroom, but also to an interruption in the day-to-day work of 
school administrators that in no way impacted or affected the day-to-
day pedagogical processes of the school in its classrooms.147 
It would be useful, of course, for the Supreme Court to clarify what 
it meant by substantial disruption, but one fears that any revisiting of 
                                                                                                                 
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).  The Court, in declaring unconstitutional the prior 
restraint imposed upon Jay Near’s Saturday Press, quoted James Madison for the 
proposition that: 
Some degree of abuse is inseparable from the proper use of everything, and in no 
instance is this more true than in that of the press.  It has accordingly been 
decided by the practice of the States, that it is better to leave a few of its 
noxious branches to their luxuriant growth, than, by pruning them away, to 
injure the vigour of those yielding the proper fruits. 
Id. at 718 (quoting Report on the Virginia Resolutions, MADISON’S WORKS, vol. IV, at 544) 
(emphasis added). 
 142. See Yudof, supra note 62, at 367 (“Tinker’s application treacherous, difficult, 
and unpredictable.”). 
 143. Id. 
 144. 523 F.3d 668 (7th Cir. 2008).  Judge Ilana Kara Diamond Rovner, who 
concurred with Posner on the outcome of Nuxoll, wrote a concurring opinion in 
which she proclaimed that “we are bound by the rule of Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. 
Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969), a case that the majority portrays in such a 
convoluted fashion that the discussion folds in on itself like a Möbius strip.”  Id. at 676 
(Rover, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 145. Id. at 676. 
 146. Id. at 674. 
 147. See Doninger v. Niehoff, 527 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding the 
punishment of student who urged other students to email and write administrators 
to complain about their actions). 
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this issue would simply give Justice Thomas another opportunity to 
influence his colleagues to overrule, or at the very least, to dilute, 
Tinker.  There is no guarantee, in other words, that the Court would 
buttress the meaning of substantial disruption in a manner that is 
more protective of student expression rights. 
There is some irony, of course, in the current efforts to crack down 
on the student expression of a generation known as the “millennials,” 
many of whom are perceived to feel an extremely strong sense of 
entitlement.148  As author Ron Alsop writes: 
Millennials are truly “trophy kids,” the pride and joy of their 
parents.  The millennials were lavishly praised and often received 
trophies when they excelled, and sometimes when they didn’t, to 
avoid damaging their self-esteem.  They and their parents have 
placed a high premium on success, filling resumes with not only 
academic accolades but also sports and other extracurricular 
activities.149 
It thus must be particularly galling to the members of this 
generation that they are not entitled to all of the perks and promises 
of freedom of expression in schools that were portended by Tinker.  
The millenials were born in the late 1970s and early 1980s,150 which 
means that in their lifetimes, the U.S. Supreme Court has never once 
ruled in favor of student expression rights. 
One must wonder here, however, whether this same generation, 
which spoke up powerfully and flexed its political muscle in the 
November 2008 presidential election,151 will tolerate the post-Tinker 
ways of censorship or will seek, as their (by-and-large) candidate of 
choice put it, “change.”152  If it really is true that Barack Obama’s 
victory over John McCain reflects “the founding fathers’ clear vision 
of the ideal makeup of a democracy:  an inclusive electorate, political 
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 149. Id. 
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at B1. 
 151. The New York Times, for instance, observed that Barack Obama’s triumph at 
the polls on November 4, 2008, 
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Damien Cave, Generation O Gets Its Hopes Up, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2008, § ST, at 1. 
 152. For instance, during his victory speech, Barack Obama proclaimed that 
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participation and political power sharing”153 and that “Obama had a 
powerful impact on youth activism,”154 this may be a generation that 
will recognize the importance of both youth and freedom of 
expression in a democratic society.  Once its members begin to 
assume positions of political power, including judgeships, a shift 
toward protecting student expression rights may occur.  Importantly, 
Obama courted many of these young voters on new technologies like 
the Internet and text messaging155 that school administrators now are 
quick to censor in cases like Wisniewski and Doninger.156 
III. CONCLUSION 
Although Tinker may not be looking fabulous at forty, none of the 
above is intended to suggest that Tinker is dead today—it still is alive 
and kicking in cases that approximate its facts.  For instance, a federal 
judge in 2003 used Tinker to protect the ability of a high school 
student in Dearborn, Michigan to wear to school a shirt featuring a 
picture of President George W. Bush and captioned with the words 
“International Terrorist.”157  As with Tinker, the case involved political 
speech that related to a controversial war—the student wore the t-
shirt to protest President Bush’s foreign policies and the imminent 
war in Iraq158—and that was conveyed silently on clothing. 
Similarly, in 2006 the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit applied Tinker to protect the right of a middle-school 
student to wear a t-shirt to school that mocked, through a 
combination of words and images, President George W. Bush “as a 
chicken-hawk president and accuses him of being a former alcohol 
and cocaine abuser.”159  Ruling in favor of the student, the Second 
Circuit observed that the parties agreed that the t-shirt did not create 
any kind of disruption in the school, let alone a substantial disruption 
under Tinker.160 
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In order for Tinker to survive its midlife crisis and to be restored to 
its original grand promise as an important barrier against school-
imposed censorship, several things must happen. 
First, judges must not give excessive deference to school 
administrators each and every time those administrators claim that 
speech, be it political or offensive or violent or some combination of 
all three, will cause a substantial or material disruption of the 
educational atmosphere.  On this point, lower courts must remind 
themselves of the language in Tinker that emphasizes an 
“undifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough 
to overcome the right to freedom of expression.”161  The Court also 
made it clear that there must be actual “evidence that [censorship] is 
necessary to avoid material and substantial interference with 
schoolwork or discipline.”162 
It is important to remember here that the year 2009 not only marks 
the fortieth anniversary of Tinker, but also the tenth anniversary of 
the tragedy at Columbine High School.163  I fear that the legacy of the 
latter, decade-old tragedy will ultimately trump the celebration of the 
ruby anniversary164 of Tinker. 
The second thing that must occur for Tinker to be reinvigorated, if 
not resuscitated, is that the rights-of-others prong of Tinker, which was 
moribund until the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Harper, must be 
abandoned.  Harper illustrates the speculative nature of its application 
and the danger that it could lead to viewpoint-based discrimination 
against political expression. 
Finally, and most importantly (beyond, of course, not letting the 
view that Justice Thomas expressed in Morse prevail at the level of the 
nation’s highest court), the Supreme Court cannot continue to carve 
out exceptions to Tinker, as it has done now in Fraser, Kuhlmeier, and 
Morse.  If it continues to go down this path, the exceptions will 
eventually swallow up the Tinker rule. 
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